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RECENT DECISIONS
parties or the registry of the car, however. It seems, therefore, that the Court
of Appeals should not find that the weight of past decision precludes it from
a reasoned approach to the facts in the instant case.
If in Kilberg the Court of Appeals effected for the victim of an airplane
crash a result that was consistent with its policy, there would seem to be no
reason why the same measure of justice should not be extended to victims
of other accidents occurring without the state, at least when the interests of
New York outweigh the interests of the foreign jurisdiction as greatly as they
did in Kilberg. It seems that Judge Fuld, at least, would be receptive to an
argument for reversal in Babcock because of his opinion in Kilberg.84 He
favored "the most significant contact or contacts" approach but considered
himself bound by the weight of prior decisions to the contrary in wrongful
death cases. Such precedent has not been established in actions for commonlaw negligence like Babcock.85 Admittedly, Kilberg has been rendered inscrutable by Davenport v. Webb. Nevertheless, the Kilberg decision arrives at
a just result and the equities seem to justify a proliferation that will reverse
and reinstate the complaint in Babcock.
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LAW, FACT-OR BOTH?

A number of cases in recent years have defined, redefined and refined
the tests of what constitutes actionable obscenity in printed matter under
state and federal obscenity statutes.' Two fundamental problems form the
core of the need for such constant adjustment (1) the necessarily vague construction of most of the relevant statutes; 2 and (2) the delicate distinctions
imposed in striking a balance between objectionable pornography and freedom
of artistic expression. 3 The decision that has had the broadest effect upon
each of these considerations, if volume of interpretive and critical comment
84. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 138 (1961) (separate
opinion). Judge Fuld concurred with the majority on affirmance of the judgment dismissing
the cause of action premised on contract but was opposed to deciding any other issue.
85. On the theory of lex loci contractus New York law has been applied in an action
against a carrier in order to avoid a Pennsylvania statute limiting recovery. Dyke v. Erie
Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871).
1. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Alberts v. California, 354 U.S.
476 (1957); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); People v. Richmond County News,
9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
2. Roth v. United States, supra note 1, at 495 (concurring opinion of Warren, CJ.);
Id. at 498-500 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.); Hayes, Survey of a Decade of Decisions
on the Law oj Obscenity, 8 Catholic Lawyer 93, 95 (1962); see generally Alpert, Judicial
Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 70-73 (1938).
3. Roth v. United States, supra note 1, at 491; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 31
U.S.L. Week 4192, 4194 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963); Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity in the
Courts, 20 Law and Contemp. Problems 587, 587 (1955); Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 368, 373 (1955);
see generally Alpert, supra note 2, at 70-73.
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is the criterion, is the United States Supreme Court case of Roth v. United
States4 and its companion, Alberts v. California. The standard arrived at by
the Court (per Brennan, J.) is basically that of the American Law Institute
Model Penal Code, 6 or, in Mr. Justice Brennan's terms, "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." 7
This standard, both in derivation and application, underscores both of the
above problems, and, to a large extent, leaves them unsolved. Three of the
most influential and prolific writers on the law of obscenity, Dean Lockhart
and Professor McClure of the University of Minnesota and Professor Kalvin
of the University of Chicago, treat both aspects and appear to reach divergent
conclusions on the merits of the work of the Supreme Court on the subject
to date.
Lockhart and McClure recognize and point up the problem of balancing
the competing values of freedom of expression and suppression of pornography, 8
and conclude that they are "satisfied that under the direction of the Supreme
Court our state and federal courts will protect freedom of expression and at
the same time permit society to protect the immature against the evils of
pornography." 9 As a personal opinion of the ability of the Supreme Court to
supply the necessary guidance in this difficult area, the statement cannot be
attacked. Yet, and the Court has so stated often, as in Roth and Butler v.
Michigan,'° it is not in any sense the immature mind or sensibility that is to
be considered, though it may be ultimately and indirectly protected. The
average adult is the "constitutionally required test audience."'" The overall
character of the challenged material must be offensive to the average adultthe reasonable man found in other areas of the law. judge Learned Hand long
ago sounded the danger involved, warning that, "to put thought in leash to
the average conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the
necessities of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy."' 2
The major criticism to be found with any of the standards of obscenity
set forth by the various courts is that these definitions beg the question of
vagueness. Professor Kalvin pinpoints this in discussing the Roth "pruriency
test": "This definition has certain advantages over its predecessors. It insists
on the average person, on the material considered as a whole, and on the
dominant theme. But it shares the central weakness of all prior legal definitions
4.
5.
6.
7.

354 U.S. 476 (1957).
354 US. 476 (1957).
American Law Institute Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
Roth v. United States, supra note 4, at 489.

8. Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38

Minn. L. Rev. 295, 368, 373 (1955).

9. Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity Censorship: the Core Constitutional Issue-

What is Obscene?, 7 Utah L. Rev. 289, 303 (1961).
10. 352 U.S. 380, 382-84 (1957).
11. Kalvin, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 7.
12. United States v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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of obscenity: the word is still defined in terms of itself."'13 This weakness comes
to the fore in the difficult middle area, between works of clear literary merit
and the smut obviously devoid of artistic purpose. 14 The courts have always
been able to cope with those situations; it is only where a functional definition
is essential that the courts have struggled to supply one and have failed.
The same weakness is apparent in the New York standard adopted in
People v. Richmond County News, 15 the "hard-core pornography test." When
Judge Fuld defined the test as proscribing "dirt for dirt's sake,"' 6 the enigma
of placing that fine line on one side of which falls pornography and on the
other art, would not seem solved. Neither "dirt" nor any of the other expletives
17
invoked by the Court creates a stronger image than does obscenity itself. '
The apparent inability of the courts and legislatures readily to define
obscenity opens the door to further disputes in application. If such judicial
interpretation or rule-making necessarily resulted in a standard allowing
consistent and predictable application in each instance, the question "Is this
book obscene?" could be one of law addressed to the court. Were the standards
so definite that the dividing line were absolute, reasonable men could not differ.
But where the decision is dependent upon a delicate balance between art and
pornography, and where the standards are defined in terms of effect upon the
average adult and the dividing line shifts with the changing standards of public
taste and morality, can it be said that consistency and predictability are even
possible? This rather loaded query leads to the greater one-who is to apply
the court devised standard, a judge or a jury? A vital part of this question
is whether the issue is one of law or of fact. Although as a question of fact a
jury may not always be required, as one of law it should never be addressed to
a jury.
At present in New York, who applies the standard is within the sound
discretion of the trial court in both civil and criminal actions. The direction
in which discretion is exercised is often determined solely by tradition. Yet,
until recently, the issue presented-the obscenity of the object(s) challengedhas been a fact question. Bunis v. Conway,' 8 however, states that, in an action
for declaratory judgment, the question is one of law.
Plaintiff Bunis sought a declaration that the novel TRxoic OF CANCER0 9
13. Kalvin, supra note 12, at 15.
14. See Kronhausen, Pornography and the Law 20, 175-244 (1959).
15. Supra note 1.
16. People v. Richmond County News, supra note 1, at 587, 175 N.E.2d at 686, 216
N.Y.S.2d at 376.
17. See, for discussions of the "hard-core" test, Lockhart and McClure, supra note 9,
at 296-302; Kalvin, supra note 11, at 43 n. 129 (difficulty in identification of hard-core
pornography) ; Hayes, supra note 2, at 103 (New York standard as narrowing the scope of

effective legal control).
18. 17 A.D.2d 207, 234 N.Y.S.2d 435 (4th Dep't 1962).
19. A number of decisions have involved the possible obscenity of Tropic of Cancer.
See, e.g., United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd
sub nor., Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) (Tropic of Cancer and
Tropic of Capricorn, both by Henry Miller, held obscene); Attorney General v. The Book
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by Henry Miller was not obscene within the scope of condemnation of section
1141 of the Penal Law, which, as pertinent to this plaintiff, makes it a misdemeanor to sell an "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic,
masochistic or disgusting book. . . ." The complaint, dismissed by the Supreme
Court, Special Term, alleged that the defendant, the District Attorney of
Monroe County, had threatened the prosecution of anyone who sold the novel
and had communicated the threat to the general public. 20 The Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, in an opinion by Justice Halpern, reversed
the order of dismissal, holding that declaratory judgment would lie, and
remanded the cause for trial on its merits. 21
New York experience concerning the nature of the issue, law or fact, and
who decides it if it is a question of fact, is of interest in its bearing upon the
Bunis decision. The court first faced the difficulty that declaratory judgment
could not lie where the pleadings presented disputed issues of fact. The general
rule has been briefly stated by Judge Desmond in a dissenting opinion: "Of
course, the presence of issues of fact does not in itself require the dismissal of
a suit for declaratory judgment ....-22
The rule is, however, different where a declaratory judgment is sought in
regard to the applicability of a statute having criminal or "quasi-criminal"
sanctions to a given situation. Dicta in DeVeau v. Braisted indicates that resort
to declaratory judgment "may be had even with respect to penal statutes and
against a public official or public agency whose duty it is to conduct appropriate prosecutions, if the purpose be to avoid irreparable injury and if the
sole question is one of law."2 3 The rule may be alternately stated to allow
declaratory judgment where "no question of fact is involved," 2' or where "an
undisputed set of facts is in question." 25
The thrust of the cases requiring undisputed facts seems to be based
Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1962) (not obscene); People v. Fritch,
Misc. 2d -, 236 N.Y.S.2d 706 (County Ct. 1963).

20. See, on threat of enforcement, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Threat of
Enforceent-Prerequisiteof a Justiciable Controversy, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 106 (1962).
21. Bunis v. Conway, supra note 18.
22. New York Post Corp. v. Kelley, 296 N.Y. 178, 192, 71 N.E.2d 456, 462 (1947)
(dissenting opinion of Desmond, J.); accord, Rockland Light and Power Co. v. City of
New York, 289 N.Y. 45, 52, 43 N.E.2d 803, 807 (1942); Chase National Bank v. Raleigh
Estates, 266 App. Div. 864, 42 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (2d Dep't 1943). Further New York Rules
of Civil Practice, Rule 213 provides:
Verdict of jury on facts. In order to settle questions of fact necessary to be determined before judgment can be rendered, the court may direct their submission to
a jury. Such verdict may be taken by the court before which the action is pending
for trial or hearing. The provisions of sections four hundred and twenty-nine and
four hundred and thirty of the civil practice act apply to a verdict so rendered.
(Added Oct. 1, 1921.)
23. 5 A.D.2d 603, 606-7, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596, 600 (1958) aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 236, 157 N.E.2d
165, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959) aff'd, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).

24. Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 206, 11 N.E.2d 728, 732
(1937).
25. Bunis v. Conway, supra note 18, at -, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 437, citing New York
Foreign Trade Zone Operators v. State Liquor Authority, 285 N.Y. 272, 34 N.E.2d 316
(1941).
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upon the ancient doctrine of Davis v. American Society that equity will not
interfere with the enforcement of the criminal law.26 The rule was discussed in
Reed v. Littleton,2 7 in which the plaintiff had been once acquitted of participating

in a gambling scheme through his purchase of options on racing greyhounds.
Subsequently the district attorney threatened further prosecutions, to which
the plaintiff responded with an action for a declaration that his acts were not
criminal. That relief was denied, Chief Judge Crane concisely outlining one
rationale:
The futility of resorting to Equity to determine whether certain or
uncertain facts constitute a crime is apparent when we consider the
different measures of proof in criminal and civil cases. Should equity
declare on disputed testimony or conflicting inferences by a fair
preponderence of the evidence that a penal violation was proved,
what would be the effect? None. It would not and could not be binding
as res adjudicata or even as stare decisis in a subsequent prosecution
wherd guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Should
equity hold that no offence had been committed it would not be
binding where the subsequent proof varied. In the meantime the
applications for injunctions staying criminal trials pending the hearing
of the equity cases for declaratory judgments would disrupt prosecu28
tions for crimes and we would have more delay than at present.
When determining whether to grant a declaratory judgment in the area
of an obscenity statute, should the issue be termed a question of law merely
for the sake of satisfying the prerequisites to declaratory relief? Certainly,
controlling principles in that collateral area of declaratory judgment offer no
justifiable basis for such a conclusion. The determination of obscenity of
particular challenged matter has traditionally been addressed to the trier of
fact in a criminal prosecution, and, apparently as often as not, to the jury.
When submitted to a jury it has been done so usually by the grace of the court,
since in New York a jury trial is not constitutionally guaranteed in a misdemeanor case 29-and a violation of section 1141 of the Penal Code is a misdemeanor. In 1884, in People v. Muller,"0 the New York Court of Appeals
adopted the English standard of obscenity as set forth in Regina v. Hicklin.31
Although Hicklin had been tried without a jury, the court alluded with
26. 75 N.Y. 362 (1878); accord, Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 209 (1906);
Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929); Mills Novelty Co. v. Sunderman, 266 N.Y. 32, 193 N.E. 541 (1934); cf., Triangle Mint Carp. v. Mulrooney, 257 N.Y.
200, 177 N.E. 420 (1931) (injunction granted where clear legal right exists and property
damage threatened).
27. 275 N.Y. 150, 9 N.E.2d 814 (1937).
28. Id. at 157, 9 N.E.2d at 817.
29. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 18; Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 177, 180, n.1,
134 N.E.2d 461, 462, n.1, 151 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640, n.1 (1956) and cases cited therein.
But see N.Y. Code of Cr. Proc. §§ 4, 419.
30. 96 N.Y. 408 (1884); see, for a broad discussion of early New York litigation in
the area of obscenity, Alpert, supra note 2, at 56-65.
31. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 369 (1868).
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approval3 2 to the case of Regina V. Moxon,33 which had been tried to a special

jury. Judge Charles Andrews in Muller was careful to state that the question
whether an object or publication was obscene was an issue for the jury. No
authority was cited, but the Court explained its view in these words:
It is to be observed that the statute does not undertake to define
obscene or indecent pictures or publications. But the words in the
statute are themselves descriptive. They are words in common use,
and every person of ordinary intelligence understands their meaning and
readily and in most cases accurately applies them to any object or
thing brought to his attention which involves his judgment as to the
quality indicated. .

. The question whether a picture or writing is

obscene is one of the plainest that can be presented to a jury, and under
judge there is little danger in their reaching a
the guidance of a 3discreet
4
wrong conclusion.
Judge Andrews' view seems almost humorous today laid beside the
mountains of modern judicial and legal verbiage which attempt to do exactly
what he thinks to be a simple task to be left to a jury-to define obscenity
correctly and practically. Quite possibly, however, Judge Andrews was wiser
in avoiding the problem that has been the direct cause of most of the growing
mountains of literature, ascertaining that same elusive definition.
As First Amendment problems 35 and other resistance to the "common use
of words" test arose in this area, the "discreet guidance" suggested by Judge
Andrews began to play an ever growing part in the jury determination of
obscenity questions. However, it has never before been said in New York that
the question of obscenity was not a question of fact for the trier of fact. As
judicial construction of statutes began to aim at precision in establishing a
standard, the tests have always been laid down in terms of the impact of
the object upon the mind of the user. This impact has usually been for the jury
to determine. The New York "hard-core" standard is no exception although it
purports to be objective in nature. The senses to be protected against the
obscene are the senses of men of ordinary walks of life, and not the senses of
judges. This was stated in Halsey v. New York Society: "The conflict among
the members of this court itself points a finger at the dangers of censorship
entrusted to men of one profession, of like education and similar surroundings.
Far better than we, is a jury drawn from those of varied experiences . .

..

0

This eloquent expression by Judge William S. Andrews in Halsey was made in
32. Id. at 374-5.
33. Regina v. Moxon, 2 Mod. St. Tr. 356 (1841).
34. Supra note 30, at 411, 413.
35. See People v. Eastman, 188 N.Y. 478, 481-82, 81 N.E. 459, 461 (1907) (concurring
opinion of Cullen, C.J.) (submission to jury of questions involving First Amendment rights
stressed) ; Id. at 488, 81 N.E. at 463 (dissenting opinion of O'Brien, J.):
The only question presented by the demurrer in this case is whether the writing in
question is, as a matter of law, not indecent. In all the cases where the question has
arisen it was held that the writing or picture must be submitted to the jury to
decide whether in fact it was indecent or not ....

36. 234 N.Y. 1, 6, 136 N.E. 219, 220 (1922).
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a civil action, one for malicious prosecution under the criminal obscenity
law, but it echoes throughout all areas in which unwarranted censorship is a
lurking menace.
Judge Loughran of the Court of Appeals somewhat synthesized the
reasoning of the judges in Muller and Halsey, the result being a strong argument in favor of a willingness by the courts to leave the determination of
obscenity, under proper instructions, to the jury:
Indecency and obscenity are not and never have been technical terms
of law and hence we are without any full or rigorous definition of the
uses made thereof in the administration of justice. . . . In the nature
of things there can be no more precise test of written indecency or
obscenity than the continuing and changeable experience of the community as to what types of books are likely to bring about the corruption of public morals or other analogous injury to the public order.
Consequently, a question as to whether a particular publication is
indecent or obscene in that sense is a question of the times which must
be determined as [a] matter of fact, unless the appearances are
thought to be necessarily
harmless from the standpoint of public
37
order or morality.
The cases discussed all indicate, with varying degrees of clarity depending
upon relevance to the specific issues to be decided, that obscenity at the lowest
judicial level is to be determined in a criminal proceeding by the trier of fact
unless, as Judge Loughran suggests, the material involved is clearly not
actionable as a matter of law. Since no jury is required as of right, but is
discretionary with the trial judge, the appellate judges may express only an
abstract belief as to who may best find such a fact. Yet, wherever the specific
point has arisen in New York in a printed opinion, it has been presented in
favor of submission to judgment of the jury. No judge has seriously disputed
the strong statement of Judge Crane that a jury best expresses the community
standard.
Section 22-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides the
district attorney with an alternate weapon for the suppression of obscene matter
in the form of an injunction against the prospective distributor. Essentially
the action presents the bare question of obscenity, since none of the other
elements required in a criminal prosecution need be in issue. The section
provides for no jury trial as of right, though one may be empaneled
in an advisory capacity. As in a criminal prosecution under section 1141
of the Penal Law, the granting of a jury trial is within the discretion of
the court. In Kingsley Books v. Brown,38 in which the constitutionality of
section 22-a was upheld, Mr. Justice Brennan vehemently dissented on the
basis that an obscenity statute not providing for a jury trial by right must
37. People v. Winters, 294 N.Y. 545, 550-51, 63 N.E.2d 98, 100-01 (1945), rev'd on
other grounds, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); see People v. Eagle, 203 Misc. 598, 601, 117 N.Y.S.2d
380, 383 (Magis. Ct. 1952).
38. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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be unconstitutional.3 9 Although in New York it has been decided that a denial
40
of a motion for a jury in such a proceeding is not an abuse of discretion,
this cannot be taken to indicate that obscenity should not still be treated as
a fact issue. Judge Fuld spoke for the Court when the Kingsley Books case was
before the New York Court of Appeals:
The mind of the trial judge must be satisfied, from a reading of the
challenged writing and a consideration of other pertinent evidence,
that it is, indeed, of the type and character condemned by the
statute. Moreover, his findings are subject to full appellate review on
the facts as well as on the law (Civ. Prac. Act, § 584). . . . The
danger of arbitrary or erroneous decision under the statute is minimized
by the
availability of appellate review of the trial court's findings of
41
fact.
Other states have enacted statutes similar to section 22-a, or at least
statutes adding an injunctive remedy to the official arsenal aimed at the
suppression of obscenity. Generally they may be divided into two categories:
those that provide and those that do not provide for a jury trial. State ex rel.
43
42
Beil v. Mahoning Valley Distributing Agency interpreted an Ohio statute
in an action by a county prosecuting attorney to enjoin the sale and distribution
of a novel. In granting the injunction and directing the seizure and destruction
of all copies of the novel, the court relied heavily upon a chapter by chapter
analysis of the book and an elaborate discussion of the Supreme Court decision
in Kingsley Books. The latter analysis made easy the conclusion that the
statute, like section 22-a, was not unconstitutional due to the lack of a jury
trial requirement.
The convenience of this injunctive remedy may, in part, be in the lack
of a jury and, more important, in the possibility of greatly relaxed procedures
in comparison to the rigidity of a criminal prosecution. Eventually the entire
proceeding might involve the submission of the matter to a judge for his
39. Id. at 448 (noting that the statutes involved in Roth and Alberts provided a jury
as of right):
The jury represents a cross-section of the community and has a special aptitude
for reflecting the view of the average person. Jury trial of obscenity therefore
provides a peculiarly competent application of the standard for judging obscenity
which, by its definition, calls for an appraisal of material according to the average
person's application of contemporary community standards. A statute which does
not afford the defendant, of right, a jury determination of obscenity falls short, in
my view, of giving proper effect to the standard fashioned as the necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech and press for material which is not
obscene. Of course, as with jury questions generally, the trial judge must initially
determine that there is a jury question, i.e., that reasonable men may differ whether
the material is obscene.
40. Tenney v. Liberty News Distributors, 13 A.D.2d 769, 215 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1st Dep't
1961); see also People v. Cohen, 22 Misc. 2d 722, 205 N.Y.S.2d 481 (County Ct. 1960)
(district attorney need not proceed under section 22-a prior to commencing a criminal
action).
41. Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 177, 185, 189, 134 N.E.2d 461, 466, 468,
151 N.Y.S.2d 639, 645, 648 (1956).
42. 169 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1960).
43. Ohio Rev. Code ch. 2905, § 2905.343 (1959).
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perusal and his immediate decision on the merits of the matter. The time
limitations imposed by section 22-a suggest that great informality must be the
result. When trial and decision are expected to come within about three days
of the service of the complaint, 44 adequate consideration and deliberation would
45
seem to be possible only in the exceptional (or easy) case.
In addition the experiences in Massachusetts and Wisconsin differ from
that of New York. Both statutes require a jury on the demand of any party
contesting the action.40 Up to 1960 there had been a total of four cases,
three in Massachusetts and one in Wisconsin, decided under these acts. 4
This phenomenon has caused at least one comment that the Wisconsin statute
is at least unnecessary and at most worthless. 48 That conclusion may be too
broad. Both statutes allow into evidence in a criminal prosecution a judgment
of obscenity in an injunctive action. 49 In Massachusetts such a judgment gives
rise to a presumption that a criminal defendant has knowledge of the nature
of the material. 50 Possibly, taken as a whole, the injunctive remedy is too
much like the criminal prosecution, and smacks of the same rigidity of procedure
to entice the prosecutor out of his element into the civil arena. The equitable
remedy is no longer a simple one for the suppression of obscenity. Yet it avoids
one monumental difficulty-the veiled threat, against the distributor, of
criminal prosecution. The bookseller is under the constant latent threat
of fine or imprisonment, and is required to exercise his own judgment constantly
to protect himself. It is only when the threat is made open and specific, as in
Bunis, that the distributor can in any manner seek the protection of the law
prior to the taking of positive action. A solution to this difficulty would be to
make the bringing of an injunctive action mandatory prior to criminal
prosecution, in which case, of course, the citation for contempt would virtually
replace the criminal prosecution.
Justice Halpern in Bunis cites two recent New York Court of Appeals
cases which declare that the legal obscenity of an article is a mixed question
of fact and constitutional law. 51 But both cases seem to assume that a pure
44. N.Y. Code of Cr. Proc. § 22-a(2) (trial of issues to commence within one day of
joinder of issue; decision to be rendered within two days of conclusion of trial).
45. For a discussion of the problems envisioned by a court even in the "easy" case,
see Stengel v. Smith, - Misc. 2d -, 236 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
46. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, §§ 28C-H (1945); Id., § 28D:
Answer by Person Interested; Jury Trial. Any person interested in the sale, loan
or distribution of said book may appear and file an answer on or before the return
day named in said notice or within such further time as the court may allow, and
may claim a right to trial by jury on the issue whether said book is obscene, indecent or impure.
Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 269, § 269.565 (1961); Id., § 269.565(2) (jury trial).
47. 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 309, 324.
48. Id. at 323.
49. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 28H (1945); see also Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 269,
§ 269.565(6) (1961).
50. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 28H (1945).
51. People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d
369 (1961); People v. Finkeistein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1962).

377
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question of fact is presented at the trial level. 52 Both cases relied heavily
upon the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Roth v. United States,
which treated the obligation of a reviewing court to consider the constitutionality
of the application of a criminal statute after a finding of obscenity by the trier
of fact.5 3 The majority opinion in Roth sets out with apparent approval the
charge to the jury of the Federal trial court-placing the entire burden of
determining obscenity upon that body. 54 Mr. Justice Harlan is more certain of
what the majority is ultimately saying than is the majority:
On this basis the constitutional question before us simply becomes, as
the Court says, whether 'obscenity,' as an abstraction, is protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the question whether a
particularbook may be suppressed becomes a mere question of classification, of 'fact,' to be entrusted to a fact-finder and insulated from
independent constitutional judgment, 5'
The objection, then, is not to the treatment as a factual issue at the trial
level, but to any view that would restrict review of the constitutionality of the
application of the statute. A strong argument may be presented that obscenity
is a fact question at the trial level and only becomes a mixed question on
appeal. At least the mixed question is logically separable, and its two aspects
should be treated at different levels of the judicial process. The argument would
proceed somewhat as follows: Pornography is not constitutionally protected
free speech or press under the First Amendment and, as applied to New York,
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and article I,
section 8 of the New York Constitution. 6 Nowhere has it been said, or can it
be, that pornography is constitutionally condemned-it simply is not protected.
Thus when a publication is declared obscene the standard must be judged by
constitutional criteria to be sure that free speech or press are not infringed.
52. People v. Richmond County News, supra note 51, at 581, 175 N.E.2d at 682, 216
N.Y.S.2d at 370 (per Fuld, J.):
Consequently, if an appellate court were to rely upon and be bound by the opinion
of the trier of the facts as to the obscenity of a publication it would be abdicating
its role as an arbiter of constitutional issues. (Emphasis added.)
See also Desmond, C. J., concurring in Richmond, Id. at 589, 175 N.E.2d at 687, 216
N.Y.S.2d at 378; People v. Finkelstein, supra note 51, at 304, 183 N.E.2d at 662, 229
N.Y.S.2d at 369-70 (per Froessel, J.).
53. 354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957):
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility by saying that
the trier of the facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned matter as
"obscene," for, if "obscenity" is to be suppressed, the question whether a particular
work is of that character involves not really an issue of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.
54. Id. at 490, quoting the instructions as follows:
In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the exclusive
judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and in determining
that conscience you are to consider the community as a whole, young and old,
educated and uneducated, the religious and the irreligious-men, women and
children.

55. Id. at 497.
56. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
31 U.S.L. Week 4192, 4194 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963).
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But no constitutional requirement is involved in a finding of no obscenity. To
declare a publication not obscene cannot be a violation of the New York or
Federal Constitutions since it does not deprive anyone of free speech, press or
other protected right. The question of constitutional law or judgment mentioned in Roth and Richmond should be presented only after a preliminary
determination of obscenity. To treat the constitutional issue at the trial level
is to anticipate it.
Justice Halpern alludes to this argument in Bunis and then proceeds to
state that a constitutional question of law may well be decided by resort to
declaratory judgment. 57 Justice Halpern's bare statement, essentially removes
any problem of fact. Declaratory judgment may be appropriate to decide constitutional questions, but implicit in this statement is the requirement that one
be present-and under the above argument one is not present until after there
is a preliminary determination of obscenity.
It may be further argued that the treatment of obscenity as a question of
constitutional law is merely a manner of reviewing a fact finding. In order to
decide on review the constitutional question presented, the court simply redetermines on review the finding of obscenity, since if the publication is
obscene, its suppression is constitutional.
Perhaps the conclusion that obscenity is a question of law is justified in part
by the comment in the opinion that a book's contents are "fixed and immutable."58 However, the disputed fact in an obscenity case is the character
of the publication-pornographic or not-not its specific content. The latter
aspect is "fixed," while character, or nature, will vary depending upon the
people determining it, no matter whether as law or fact. But the fact that
content is unchangeable does allow a somewhat different treatment of the
applicability of the declaratory judgment remedy. That content, as "fixed,"
provides a valid ground for distinguishing Reed v. Littleton"9 (as well as the
other precedents set out in Bunis requiring that no disputed question of fact be
involved"° ) insofar as the Court in Reed feared a changing of the facts subsequent to a civil action, which would render the prior civil judgment without
binding effect in a later criminal action.
The Court in Reed also pointed out that the standards of proof required
in criminal and civil actions are quite different. But an exception is found
where the issue of obscenity is singled out. 0 ' The standard for determining
obscenity in New York, the "hard-core" test, is uniform throughout both
civil and criminal actions. Therefore the evidentiary requirements cannot vary.
This issue is separable from the others which appear in the criminal action
because they do not even appear where declaratory relief is sought. No conflict
between differing requirements of -proof arises on those questions.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Bunis v. Conway, 17 A.D.2d -, -, 234 N.Y.S.2d 435, 438-9 (1962).
Id. at -, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 157, 9 N.E.2d 814, 817 (1937).
Bunis v. Conway, supra note 57, at -, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 437-8.
Supra note 59, at 157, 9 N.E.2d at 817.
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Based upon this analysis, there was no need to term obscenity a question
of law. Justice Halpern could have indicated that the problems envisioned in
the precedents discussed in Bunis do not militate against allowing the remedy
in the instant case even though a question of fact did exist. Another path to
the same result as reached in the case was open.
Justice Halpern's solution to the seeming inapplicability of declaratory
judgment represents another balancing of interests-that of retaining what in
New York has been a trend clear enough to require only casual mention, that
the obscenity of a particular book is a question of fact, as against the prevention of an unauthorized censorship by a public official. Taken at face value,
the conclusion that obscenity is a question of law fails to square with the treatment of the issue in either a criminal prosecution or an injunctive action. But
Justice Halpern cannot avoid the traditional treatment so easily, and conditioned his statement by discussing at length the complicated theory of a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. Apparently he would term it, in this
proceeding, a mixed question at the trial level-a question of law to bring it
within the scope of declaratory judgment, and one of fact to allow the trial
judge to summon an advisory jury to determine the issue according to prevailing community standards. Submission to a jury is specifically suggested by the
court with Rule 213 as the requisite authority. 62 Since Rule 213 applies only to
fact issues, the result amounts to the finding of such a factual question as
should be submitted to a jury but cannot deny resort to declaratory judgment.
It is unfortunate that Justice Halpern termed it a special variety of law issue
rather than a fact issue of a special nature, since it is all too easy to delete his
statements from their present context, without apparent violence, and present
them as authority for the broad conclusion that the "obscenity of a particular
book is a question of law." In point of fact the first reported case citing Bunis
as authority does just that. People v. Fritch63 in utilizing Bunis does so only to
the extent of the quotation in which Justice Halpern reaches that conclusion,
adding emphasis by italicizing the phrase "is a question of law." 4 The case
came before the County Court on appeal from convictions under section 1141,
upon a jury verdict, for selling TRoPIc oF CANCER. In reversing the convictions
the Court further discussed considerations of constitutionality but basically
found error in a refusal below to determine the book not obscene as a matter
of law and that "while it may be said, in obscenity cases, that the judgment of
a jury is a valuable aid to the Court in determining community standards,
nevertheless, the Court may not relinquish its responsibility in deciding the
questions of law therein presented." 0 5 Already the conclusion has escaped the
narrow bounds of declaratory judgment; Fritch would indicate that it applies
in a criminal trial court as well.
62. Bunis v.
63. - Misc.
64. Id. at-,
65. Id. at -,

Conway, supra note 57, at -, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
2d -, 236 N.Y.S.2d 706 (County Ct. 1963).
236 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
236 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
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Only when read with utmost care does the Bunis opinion become the
compromise it must be. The court is forced to its conclusion by the dangers of
6
informal, extralegal censorship such as District Attorney Conway's edict. This
danger arises in various circumstances and is handled in quite different manners
7
by different courts. In Sunshine Book Co. v. McCafferyU the New York City
Commissioner of Licenses sent to newsdealers a letter threatening suspension
or revocation of the licenses of those who offered for sale copies of the plaintiff
publisher's periodicals. The trial court empaneled a jury to determine the
obscenity of certain of the publications. Upon a finding that those magazines
submitted were obscene, the court dismissed the complaint seeking declaratory
judgment. The Appellate Division, First Department reversed and ordered the
letter recalled, finding the Commissioner's actions to be an unauthorized prior
restraint. However, the court avoided the issue as to those publications found
obscene basing its decision upon the effect upon future issues. Similar reasoning
would seem pertinent in Bunis, even though it involves only one book and not
a series of magazines any one of which could or could not be obscene. The Bunis
decision is, in effect, a rebuke of the official action, in offering the plaintiff the
only possible protection against the threat, a clear understanding of his rights.
The Supreme Court found a different sort of censorship in Smith v. California,68 striking down a Los Angeles city ordinance authorizing a criminal
prosecution in cases where the bookseller had no knowledge of the obscene
contents of a book. Mr. Justice Brennan feared a "censorship by booksellers"
of non-obscene matter, concluding that, in the face of such an ordinance, a
bookseller would risk selling only those books which he thought to be safe or
with which he was personally acquainted. The effect upon a distributor of that
or a similar statute cannot be distinguished from the effect of an official threat
except insofar as the District Attorney's opinion of what is obscene and therefore not "safe" is substituted for that of the bookseller.
Federal courts seem to have encountered little or no difficulty in allowing
a distributor or publisher access to declaratory judgment or in striking down
administrative censorship, while disagreeing on the issue of whether obscenity
presents a question of law or of fact. Two recent cases are of interest because
of this divergence. Both involve a determination by the Post Office Department
that particular publications were obscene and could not be sent through the
mails. Both plaintiffs sought an injunction against the enforcement of the Post
Office Department order and a declaration that the matter was not obscene. A
69
District Court Judge in Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff and vacated the order, stating that, on the basis of Roth
v. United States, obscenity is definitely a question of fact, but that the administrative factual determination had not been based upon substantial evidence.
66. Bunis v. Conwav. supra note 57, at -, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
67. 4 A.D.2d 643, 168 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1st Dep't 1957).
68. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).

69.

186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. IL.1960).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Judge Clark in Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry70 affirmed a lower court
order vacating a similar Post Office ruling against LADY CHATTERLY'S LOVER,
by D. H. Lawrence, stating that, "the question was thus one starkly of law," 71
and that, therefore "there was no occasion for the application of the substantial
evidence rule." 72 The decisions are consistent only in the vacatur of the Postmaster General's orders. Judge Clark went further in an elaborate footnote to
his opinion:
The argument based on the fact that criminal prosecutions under this
statute are tried to the jury seems beside the point. The jury must of
course find even beyond a reasonable doubt various elements not here
involved, such as criminal intent. And courts do not hesitate to dismiss
charges when clear that law has not been violated. (Citations omitted.)
So, too, the contention that judges have no more competence to be
literary censors than the Postmaster General, while perhaps true in
itself, overlooks the ultimate
responsibility of courts to enforce the
73
law and the Constitution.
Whether Judge Clark would utilize the same reasoning in favor of the
censor is left in doubt by the apparent consistency of the federal courts in
deciding against the censors.
Perhaps recourse to declaratory relief provides much protection for the
distributor against some censors. Both forms of civil action directed against
obscene material, that under section 22-a and the declaratory relief, provide
for appellate review of all issues, thus satisfying one of the criteria of Professors Lockhart and McClure:
When a case has been carried to court, the controlling decision has
too often been made by a single trial judge, with or without a jury,
with no careful, independent review of the issue by an appellate court.
It is our contention that the final agency to determine what literature
may be censored must be an appellate court operating under uniform
constitutional standards and subject to ultimate review by the United
States Supreme Court. 74
Consistency of review is present now in all criminal and civil obscenity actions,
there being review on the constitutional basis upon a determination of obscenity
in all instances.
But, remembering Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting demand that all constitutional obscenity statutes must provide for a jury as of right,75 it is discouraging that the judiciary is to be substituted as a censor for the bookseller,
the district attorney, and the average adult so cherished as an audience and
70. 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
71.

Id. at 436.

72. Id. at 435.
73. Id. at 436, n.3.
74. Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution,
38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 388 (1955).

75. Supra note 39.
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arbiter by the Supreme Court in Butler.70 A true community standard is difficult enough to discover through recourse to a jury, presumably composed from
the broad spectrum or cross-section of society. Conflicts based upon religion and
morals might well be heated within such a group. If a judge is to make the
decision, as often happens, he must determine this community standard himself. Whether he could avoid applying the standard of the judicial community
is impossible to determine.
Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. as early as 1940 advocated the enactment
77
of new declaratory judgment statutes expressly to determine obscenity. The
need for such statutes he traced to the inapplicability of the present statute
7
in New York due to such cases as Reed v. Littleton." His emphasis was upon
a need for the submission of the issue of obscenity to a jury. It is inteersting to
note that again Professor Kalvin, among others, tends to disagree with Professors Lockhart and McClure:
Finally, I wonder whether the only experts on the issue at hand are
not the jury, as Judge Learned Hand suggested years ago, and whether
the logic of Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not lead to the conclusion
79
that the jury is the proper constitutional arbiter of obscenity.
None of the present legislative and judicial thrusts at pornography in
New York supply a jury of "average adults" as a matter of right. They do
present, however, a rather unrealistic and confusing conglomeration of mixed
questions, questions of law, questions of fact, findings by advisory or discretionarily empaneled juries, and findings by judges or panels of judges in
criminal or civil courts. It would not seem too late to implement the proposals
of Professor Chafee, made over twenty years ago, and to suggest that it may
be time to require that the question be submitted to a jury in all proceedings.
This method could not disrupt the present consistency of review, since a finding
of obscenity would still require appellate examination to prevent conflicts with
rights guaranteed by the New York and United States constitutions. The constant submission to juries composed of average adults would aptly indicate
community standards as they changed and were applied to the publication(s)
involved. Quite possibly many of the difficulties encountered by the courts
have stemmed from a lack of consistency of treatment by legislatures and
earlier courts. Instead of simplification of procedures to effect consistent treat76. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
77. Chafee, Censorship of Plays and Books, 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 16, 20 (1940); id.
at 23.:
Accordingly, my conclusion, both as to plays and books, is that decisions on the
issue of indecency should be made by the citizens themselves through qualified
juries. The practical problem is to make such jury verdicts more convenient than
in the ordinary criminal prosecution, so as to lessen the risk of honest theatre
owners, producers, publishers, and booksellers who are anxious to obtain legal
determination before going ahead.
78. Id. at 20; see Reed v. Littleton, supra note 59.
79. Kalvin, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 39-40,
citing United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936) (per L. Hand, J.); Smith
v. California, supra note 68, at 161-7 (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ment, decision after decision tends toward further complication as each court
reacts to the exigencies of the particular situation as colored by the deep
seated opinions each judge seems to have concerning obscenity. All, however,
seem to recognize, and the conflicts bear out, that a special problem exists. That
problem seems to be that the "definition of obscenity" rests within the mind of
the average adult, in his sensibilities and morality, and no one is quite certain
how to discover this definition while obeying the commands of our constitutions.
The best manner of discovering the "definition of obscenity" in each case
is to go to its source, the average adult. The average adult is a composite
being, comprised of six or twelve individual adults-the jury-not a judge.
RICHARD S. MAYBERRY

EQUITY AwARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES-A RAPE BUT RECURRABLE INSTANCE
Defendant corporation owned and leased to plaintiff corporation premises
located at 210 Central Park South. Under the terms of the lease both parties
waived jury trial in any matter connected with the tenant's occupancy. The
defendant landlord, finding that income could be increased by destroying the
premises and redeveloping the site, notified plaintiff that the corporation was
going to terminate the lease; this notice was rejected by the plaintiff. Defendant
landlord broke through a strong door of the premises at night, removed all electric fuses and boarded up the windows and entrances. Plaintiff removed these
boards and went about his business while the defendant made further plans.
Again the defendant lessor entered the locked premises and employed an ironworker to bar the windows and entrances with welded metal bars and plates.
The lessee removed these bars, hired armed guards to prevent further intrusion
and initiated an action for injunction and received a temporary injunction. At
the trial the plaintiff was allowed to amend the complaint to plead that the
acts complained of were willful and wanton and to include a prayer for punitive
as well as compensatory damages. The trial court awarded a permanent injunction, compensatory damages, and punitive damages of three times the compensatory damages! On appeal it was held that punitive damages may be
awarded in addition to injunctive relief, but the court reduced the findings of
the amount of compensatory and punitive damages.1
Exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages, sometimes called "smart
money," are awarded to penalize the defendant as a deterrent or to make an
example of him for his willful, wanton or malicious conduct. 2 The action for
recovery of such has historically been one at law and the great weight of
authority outside New York has denied that a court of equity has power to
1. I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park South Corp., 27 Misc.2d 964, 212 N.Y.S.2d 136
(Sup. Ct. 1961), modified, 16 A.D.2d 461, 228 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1st Dep't 1962).
2. E.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961);
Douglas v. Tomnkins Realty Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 192, 210 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1960).

